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Abstract
Can we use the lens of dual-system theories to explain altruistic behavior? In recent 
years this question has attracted the interest of both economists and psychologists. 
We contribute to this emerging literature by reporting the results of a meta-study 
of the literature and a new experiment. Our meta-study is based on 22 experimental 
studies conducted with more than 12,000 subjects. We show that the overall effect 
of manipulating cognitive resources to promote the “intuitive” system at the expense 
of the “deliberative” system is very close to zero. One reason for this null result 
could be that promoting intuition has heterogeneous effects on altruism across dif-
ferent subgroups of subjects or contexts. Another reason could be that there sim-
ply is no real effect and that previously reported single results are false positives. 
We explore the role of heterogeneity both by performing a mediator analysis of the 
meta-analytic effect and by conducting a new experiment designed to circumvent the 
issue of potential heterogeneity in the direction of the effect of promoting intuition. 
In both cases, we find little evidence that heterogeneity explains the absence of an 
overall effect of intuition on altruism. Taken together, our results offer little support 
for dual-system theories of altruistic behavior.
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1 Introduction
A recent literature in economics and psychology argues that human behavior can 
be understood as the interaction between two different decision systems (Kah-
neman 2002, 2011): one that is fast, intuitive, automatic and largely effortless 
(“System 1”), and one that is slower, more deliberate, and requires some level of 
reflection and cognitive effort (“System 2”). For some decisions, the two systems 
may diverge in the choices they favor: while deliberation may pull the individual 
towards a certain choice (e.g., keeping a healthy diet), intuition may pull them 
towards a different choice (e.g., eating tasty but highly caloric food). In these 
cases, an individual must use willpower and spend cognitive resources to override 
the intuitive impulse and take the choice favored by the deliberative system.
It has been suggested that altruistic behavior can also be rationalized by 
this dual-system framework (Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2007; Moore and 
Loewenstein 2004; Zaki and Mitchell 2013; Deck and Jahedi 2015; Dreber et al. 
2016). One of the most debated questions in this literature is whether altruism 
(and pro-social behavior more generally) is a spontaneous and intuitive response, 
where individuals must use willpower if they wish to act in their self-interest; or 
whether instead self-interest is intuitive, and individuals must use willpower to 
behave pro-socially.
A number of experiments have been designed to address this question. These 
experiments rely on different types of manipulations, designed to inhibit one of 
the systems and promote the other. For example, subjects in an experiment may 
be asked to distribute an amount of money between themselves and another par-
ticipant (e.g., in a dictator game), while at the same time performing another task 
that is more or less cognitively-taxing (e.g., holding a 7-digit or 3-digit number 
in their memory). Compared to subjects who perform the easier task, subjects 
who perform the hard task are under “cognitive load”: they have fewer cognitive 
resources to devote to the dictator game decision, and are therefore less able to 
use their deliberative system when deciding how much to give to the other par-
ticipant. Other commonly used types of manipulations include: “ego depletion” 
where subjects participate in a sequence of two tasks, the first to deplete cognitive 
resources, and the second to measure how the consequent reduced ability to use 
deliberation affects behavior; “time pressure” where subjects are forced to make a 
decision either quickly or after having deliberated for some time; and “priming” 
where subjects are consciously or subconsciously encouraged to decide using 
either their intuitive or deliberative system.
In this paper, we report a meta-analysis of the experimental studies that have 
used cognitive load, ego depletion, time pressure, and priming to study the effects 
of promoting intuition on altruistic behavior. Our meta-study covers 22 papers 
involving a total of 60 experiments and more than 12,000 subjects. We find that 
in 57% of the experiments, promoting intuition leads to more self-interested 
behavior, suggesting that self-interest is an intuitive response. In the other 43% 
of experiments promoting intuition encourages more altruistic behavior, suggest-
ing that altruism, and not self-interest, is intuitive. These effects, however, are 
981
1 3
Altruism, fast and slow? Evidence from a meta-analysis and…
statistically significant only in a minority of studies. In the large majority of cases 
(78% of experiments), the effect of promoting intuition is insignificantly differ-
ent from zero. The overall effect size estimated across all 60 experiments is only 
− 0.015, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that this is actually zero.
It is unclear how to interpret this evidence. On the one hand, taken at face value, 
the fact that the literature has found effects in either direction, and an average esti-
mated effect close to zero, may suggest that the true underlying effect is actually 
very small or non-existent, and that the few significant effects reported in the litera-
ture are false positives. That is, altruism is neither fast nor slow: this type of behav-
ior simply escapes the logic of the dual-system framework.
On the other hand, some researchers have argued that whether intuition favors 
altruism or self-interest may depend on a variety of individual, social, and contex-
tual factors. While for some subgroups of individuals in some specific situations 
intuition may favor altruism, for other subgroups or situations intuition may favor 
self-interest (e.g., Hauge et al. 2016; Rand et al. 2016; Grossman and Van der Weele 
2017; Balafoutas et  al. 2018). That is, the mixed results reported in the literature 
could simply reflect a genuine heterogeneity in the underlying decision processes 
that different individuals use in different situations—and since this heterogeneity 
is typically unanticipated and unaccounted for in most existing studies, this could 
explain why the reported overall effect is small and close to zero in most of the 
literature.
To assess the role of heterogeneity in explaining the mixed results found in the 
literature, we conduct a mediator analysis to identify factors that may account for 
systematic differences across studies in the size and direction of the effect of intui-
tion on altruism. We examine a variety of factors that have been proposed in the 
literature as possible mediators of the effect, including gender (Rand et  al. 2016), 
the frame of the game (Hauge et al. 2016; Banker et al. 2017; Gärtner 2018), and the 
experimental stakes (Mrkva 2017; Andersen et al. 2018). With the possible excep-
tion of the frame of the game, for which we find mixed support, we find no evidence 
that any of the factors we consider can explain the variance in effect sizes across 
studies. For gender, a previous meta-analysis by Rand et al. (2016) found that pro-
moting intuition has significantly different effects for women and men: the effect is 
positive and significant for women, but negative and insignificant for men. If any-
thing, our analysis, which subsumes most of Rand et  al.’s data and is based on a 
much larger number of studies, finds the opposite: the effect is negative for both 
women and men (significantly so only for the latter), and we cannot reject the null of 
no difference in the size of the effect between genders.
These results lend little support to the argument that there may be a genuine 
heterogeneity in the size and direction of the effect of intuition on altruism across 
different subsamples and that this may explain the mixed evidence reported in the 
literature about the overall effect of intuition on altruism. To further probe this con-
clusion, in the last part of the paper we report a new experimental test of the hypoth-
esis that altruistic behavior responds to the logic of the dual-system model. While 
existing studies have tested this hypothesis by studying whether promoting System 
1 makes individuals more altruistic or more self-interested, we examine whether 
making choices that involve a trade-off between altruism and self-interest triggers 
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a conflict between the two systems that is cognitively taxing and willpower-deplet-
ing. An advantage of our experimental test is that, unlike existing experiments, it is 
robust to the presence of heterogeneity in whether System 1 favors altruism or self-
interest. Even if System 1 is altruistic for some individuals and self-interested for 
others, both types of subjects would have to spend willpower to regulate a conflict 
between self-interest and altruism, as long as System 1 and 2 diverge in the behav-
ioral motive that they favor. We do not find evidence that facing a trade-off between 
self-interested and altruistic choices depletes willpower. Taken together the results 
from our meta-study and our new experiment offer little support for a dual-system 
theory of altruistic behavior.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Sect.  2 we present the 
findings of our meta-analysis of the existing literature. Section  3 describes the 
design and results of the new experiment. Section 4 concludes.
2  Meta‑study
2.1  Design
We searched the literature for experimental studies investigating the effect of pro-
moting intuition on altruistic behavior. We include studies that use one of the four 
standard types of interventions to promote intuition at the expense of deliberation 
(cognitive load, ego depletion, time pressure, or priming), and that assess the effect 
of these interventions of individuals’ decisions to distribute wealth between them-
selves and another passive player.1 The passive player can be another participant in 
the experiment (as in standard dictator games), or a charitable organization (as in 
donation experiments). In all cases, the decisions must involve a trade-off between 
the decision-maker’s and passive player’s payoffs (i.e., we exclude settings in which 
the decision-maker can increase the passive player’s payoff at no cost for themselves; 
or cases where the choice that maximizes the decision-maker’s payoff also maxi-
mizes the passive player’s payoff). We require that the study adheres to the method-
ology of experimental economics (i.e., no deception), and that decisions have real 
monetary consequences for the parties involved (i.e., no hypothetical studies). For 
more details on the selection process, see Appendix A in the Online Supplementary 
Materials (OSM).
1 The proliferation of studies using cognitive resources manipulations has triggered a number of recent 
meta-studies of these literatures. For example, Rand (2016), Kvarven et  al. (2019), and Rand (2019) 
assess the role of intuition and deliberation in cooperation decisions. Verschuere et al. (2018) study the 
role of cognitive load interventions on lying. Rand et al. (2016)—discussed in more detail below—study 
how the interaction between gender and intuition shapes dictator game decisions.
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Based on our inclusion criteria, the meta-study covers 22 studies involving 60 
experiments conducted with a total of 12,574 subjects across 12 countries.2 About 
half of the experiments were run with university students, a third with Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers, and the rest with other specific non-student 
samples, for instance junior school students or members of the general population. 
About two-thirds of experiments involved some type of dictator game decision 
(where the passive players are other experiment participants), while the rest involved 
a charitable donation decision. Table A.1 lists all included studies and the number of 
experiments each study contributed to the meta-study.3
For each experiment, we quantified the effect that promoting intuition had on 
altruistic behavior by calculating the standardized mean difference (Cohen’s d) in 
altruism between the experimental condition that promoted intuition and the con-
dition that promoted deliberation.4 In most cases, we measured altruism as the 
monetary amount (or fraction of endowment) that the decision-maker gives to the 
passive player; in studies involving binary dictator decisions, we used the fraction 
of decision-makers sacrificing own payoff to increase the passive player’s payoff.5 
In all cases, a positive effect size indicates that individuals became more altruistic 
when intuition was promoted, relative to the condition that promoted deliberation. 
In contrast, a negative effect size indicates that promoting intuition made individuals 
more self-regarding.
2.2  Results
Figure  1 contains a forest plot showing, for each of the 60 experiments included 
in our study, the associated effect size and 95% confidence interval.6 The figure is 
2 Rand et al. (2016) also conducted a meta-analysis of the literature on the role of intuition in dictator 
game decisions, with the special focus on gender as mediator of the main effect. Their study covers 22 
experiments involving 4366 subjects. Rand and colleagues kindly shared their dataset with us, and we 
therefore include in our meta-study all experiments covered in their analysis, with the exception of 4 
experiments from 2 studies that involve deception. In addition, our meta-analysis includes another 19 
studies (42 experiments, 8472 subjects) that were not included in Rand et al.’s meta-study.
3 In most cases, a single study contains more than one treatment (or was run in more than one location), 
hence most studies contribute more than one experiment each to the meta-study.
4 Formulas are provided in Appendix A. We apply Hedges’ correction for small sample bias to calculate 
effect sizes and associated standard errors (see Lipsey and Wilson 2001).
5 The information required to perform these calculations was retrieved either from the statistics, graphs 
and tables reported in the papers, or from data made available by the authors (marked by * in Table A.1). 
In some cases, the analyses reported in the papers are based on subsets of the data collected (e.g. only 
using subjects who are compliant to the time pressure manipulation; or only using subjects who pass 
an attention check). Wherever possible we base our meta-analysis on the full datasets—i.e. including 
all subjects for which there are data, regardless of the exclusion criteria used in the original papers. See 
Appendix A for further details.
6 The 95% confidence intervals reported in the meta-study are computed as ES ± 1.96 ∗ SEES where ES 
is the effect size (Cohen’s d), SEES is the standard error of the effect size estimate, and 1.96 is the z-score 
for the 97.5 percentile point of the normal distribution. Wherever in the paper we make statements such 
as “the 95% confidence interval of the effect size includes zero” we simply mean that we cannot reject 
the null that the effect size is zero. See Morey et al. (2016) for a discussion of the fallacies in interpreting 
confidence intervals in frequentist statistics.
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divided into four panels, one for each type of intervention included in the meta-
study. In each panel, the bottom row reports the average effect size and associated 
confidence interval of each intervention, estimated using a random-effects meta-
analysis model. The last row of the figure reports the overall effect size estimated 
across all four types of interventions.
For each type of intervention, there are experiments associated with both negative 
and positive effect sizes. Across the four types of interventions, 57% of experiments 
report a negative effect of promoting intuition, while the remaining 43% report a 
positive effect. In most cases, however, the 95% confidence interval of the effect size 
includes zero. Only in 13 out of 60 experiments (22% of cases) does the confidence 
Fig. 1  Results of the random-effects meta-analysis of promoting intuition on altruism. Note: Effect sizes 
(ES) measured as standardized mean difference in altruism between conditions where intuition or delib-
eration were promoted. Positive values imply more altruism in the intuitive condition. Error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals. The size of the grey boxes indicates the weight of the effect size in the meta-
analysis (the relative weights are also reported in the last column of the figure). In each panel of the fig-
ure, the row labeled “Subtotal” reports the average effect size for each type of intervention, estimated by 
the random-effects meta-analysis model. The last row of the figure (labeled “Overall”) reports the aver-
age effect size across all experiments and its associated confidence interval. For a legend of the experi-
ment IDs refer to Table A.1 in the OSM
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interval not contain zero: in 8 cases the estimated effect size is negative, and in the 
remaining 5 cases it is positive.
As a consequence, the average effect size of each type of intervention is very 
small and not different from zero at the 5% significance level or lower: 0.021 for cog-
nitive load studies (p = 0.766), − 0.034 for time pressure studies (p = 0.349), − 0.025 
for ego depletion studies (p = 0.803), and 0.012 for priming studies (p = 0.858). 
Across all types of interventions, the overall effect size is − 0.015, with an associ-
ated 95% confidence interval of [− 0.070, 0.041]. We cannot reject the null that the 
overall effect size is actually zero (z = 0.51, p = 0.607).
Based on these results, what should we conclude about the role of intuition and 
deliberation for altruistic behavior? The face-value interpretation of our findings is 
that promoting intuition has only a very small (if any) effect on altruistic choices. 
Thus, one may conclude that the logic of the dual-system model does not extend to 
altruistic behavior.
However, several researchers have suggested that the mixed evidence concerning 
the overall effect of promoting intuition on altruism may reflect a genuine heteroge-
neity in the size and direction of the effect across different subgroups of the popula-
tion, or across different decision settings. That is, the researcher may observe no 
aggregate effect of the intervention on altruistic behavior, when in fact the manipu-
lation may have led a subgroup of subjects to become more altruistic and another 
subgroup to become more self-regarding—with the two opposing effects cancelling 
each other out in the aggregate.
Rand et  al. (2016) for instance, propose that what is automatized as an intui-
tive response depends on the strategies that are typically advantageous in one’s 
daily social interactions. They argue that what constitutes a socially advantageous 
strategy may vary across individuals or groups, and propose that gender may be 
an important moderating factor in the case of altruism: altruism may be an intui-
tive social response for women, but less so for men. Other researchers have argued 
that the underlying pro-social inclinations of the individual may moderate the effect 
of intuition on altruism: while altruism may be an intuitive response for pro-social 
types, the opposite may be true for self-interested types (e.g., Balafoutas et al. 2018; 
Chen and Krajbich 2018). Moreover, some researchers have focused on contextual 
and situational factors as possible mediators of the effect of promoting intuition 
on altruism. Andersen et  al. (2018) and Mrkva (2017), for instance, examine the 
role of experimental stakes. Banker et al. (2017) propose that there is an interaction 
between the effect of promoting intuition and whether the decision situation uses a 
“giving” or “taking” frame: in the former case, manipulations that promote intuition 
may decrease altruism, while in the latter case they may increase altruism.
However, because the evidence of heterogeneous effects inevitably relies on mul-
tiple tests of the same hypothesis (e.g., separate tests among men and women of the 
hypothesis that intuition promotes altruism), a potential concern is that some of the 
reported heterogeneous effects may actually be false positives rather than reflect a 
genuine heterogeneity in the effect for different subgroups or contexts. The prob-
lem may be exacerbated in cases where the multiple comparisons are the result of 
data-dependent analyses, a phenomenon that has been referred to as “forking” (e.g., 
Gelman and Loken 2013). Moreover, the problem may be further amplified when 
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the reported heterogeneous effects are discovered by aggregating data from several 
studies that contain false-positive results, as it may be the case in “internal meta-
analyses” where inferences are based on the aggregated analysis of multiple experi-
ments reported in the same paper (Vosgerau et al. 2018).
In the next section, we use the meta-study to assess the extent to which various 
individual and situational factors discussed in the literature can explain the variance 
in effect sizes across experiments included in our analysis. The advantage of this 
approach is that we can test the role of each factor by relying on information from 
papers that did not necessarily focus on that factor to organize their own data. For 
instance, we can test the hypothesis that intuition promotes altruism among women 
but not among men, by combining data from studies that did and did not analyze the 
effect disaggregated by gender. Since we can rely on information from variables that 
the original authors may not have used in their analysis or publication decisions, this 
approach potentially mitigates the bias introduced by data-dependent analyses.
2.3  Mediator analysis
We examine the extent to which the effect of promoting intuition on altruism may 
be moderated by a long list of factors discussed in the literature, namely: the role of 
gender; the type of intervention used to manipulate cognitive resources; the frame 
of the game (give or take); the nature of the passive player (another participant or a 
charity); the stakes used in the experiment, the type of subject pool used to conduct 
the study (e.g., students, AMT workers, etc.); and the location where the experi-
ment was run. For each factor, we conduct a random-effects meta-regression where 
the dependent variable is the effect size detected in the experiment, and where each 
experiment is weighted by the inverse of its variance so that more precise studies 
have more influence in the analysis. The regressions for these variables (with the 
exception of gender, discussed below) are reported in Table 1.
The last two columns of Table  1 report specifications where all mediators are 
simultaneously included in the regression. In column (7) we include study dum-
mies—not reported in the table—to account for study fixed effects (these are also 
included in all regressions of columns 1–6), while in column (8) we report a specifi-
cation without study fixed effects (see Table A.3 in the OSM for versions of regres-
sions 1–6 without study fixed effects). There are advantages and disadvantages to 
either specification. The study fixed-effects specification exploits within-study vari-
ation in the mediators of interest, controlling for potential unobservable idiosyncra-
sies of the individual studies (e.g., specific characteristics of the subject pool used 
in a given study). This is a very clean form of identification, especially for variables 
that the researcher has randomized at the study level (e.g., take or give frame treat-
ments). However, the large number of study dummies (22) compared to the rela-
tive small number of observations (60) raises potential concerns about overfitting. 
Moreover, removing the study fixed-effects allows to exploit between-study varia-
tion in the mediators of interest, which, as discussed earlier, is valuable if one is 
concerned that the choice of treatments within a study may have been partly data-
driven. As we show below, although estimates vary between the two approaches, 
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the two identification strategies lead to the same conclusions in all but one case (the 
effect of the frame of the game).
Stakes Some authors have argued that whether intuition favors altruism or self-
interest depends on the amount of money at stake in the decision situation. For 
instance, Mrkva (2017) argues that when stakes are high, an individual’s impulsive 
response is to reject a request for money, and that generosity may thus be fostered 
by deliberation, while the reverse may happen when stakes are low. The stake level 
is defined as the maximum payoff available to the decision-maker (e.g. in a dictator 
game, the endowment received by the dictator), converted in 2017 USD PPP and 
multiplied by the probability that this amount is actually paid to the subject (in sev-
eral studies not all choices made by subjects are paid with certainty, either because 
the study uses role uncertainty or because the giving decision is part of a set of tasks 
and the random lottery incentive system is used).7 Column (1) of Table 1 reports the 
Table 1  Mediator analysis: random-effects meta-regressions
Dependent variable is the effect size associated to an experiment





























































Study FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
N. effect sizes 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
N. experiments 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
N. subjects 12,574 12,574 12,574 12,574 12,574 12,574 12,574 12,574
7 In three cases (one experiment of Mrkva 2017 and two experiments of Banker et al. 2017), the papers 
did not report sufficient information about the probability with which each choice was paid. In these 
cases, we assumed that the stakes were similar to those used in the other experiments reported in those 
papers.
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regression results. We do not find any significant association between stake level and 
effect size (p = 0.522). We find the same result in the regressions of columns (7) and 
(8), where we control for other mediators. We conclude that stakes are not a signifi-
cant mediator of the effect of intuition on altruism.
Sample In column (2) we investigate whether there is heterogeneity in the effect 
sizes associated with different types of samples with which the experiments were 
run (students, AMT workers, etc.). The base category in the regression are stud-
ies run with non-student samples that are not AMT workers. We do not detect any 
significant differences between the base category (n. experiments = 7) and AMT 
workers (n = 20) or students (n = 33). We also do not find any significant difference 
between AMT workers and students (F-test: p = 0.129). This is also true for the 
regressions in columns (7) and (8).
Location of the experiment In column (3) we explore whether the location where 
the experiment was run affects the estimate of the effect size. About half of the 
experiments were run in the US (n = 31), about a third in Europe (n = 23), while 
the rest in other countries such as Chile, India, Israel or Tunisia (the base category 
in the regression, n = 7).8 We do not detect any difference between experiments run 
in Chile, India, Israel or Tunisia and those run in the US or Europe, nor do we find 
a difference between Europe and the US (F-test: p = 0.151). The same holds for the 
regressions in columns (7) and (8).
Charity as passive player About a third of experiments were based on donation 
games (n = 17), where decision-makers decide how much money to donate to a char-
itable organization. We do not find that the effect sizes in these studies differ from 
those reported in the dictator game experiments, as shown in columns (4), (7) and 
(8).
Frame of the game Banker et  al. (2017) argue that the framing of the decision 
situation plays an important role in determining whether altruism or self-interest 
are an intuitive response. This is because intuition may favor choices that are sali-
ent. When the choice involves taking money that has been initially allocated to the 
passive player, the salient cue is to leave the amount with the passive player, and 
therefore promoting intuition will lead to more altruism. The reverse may happen 
when the choice involves giving money that has been initially allocated to the deci-
sion-maker. Gärtner (2018) entertains a similar hypothesis. Hauge et al. (2016) also 
report games with either give or take frames. In column (5) we test whether experi-
ments using a take frame (n = 8) are associated with larger effect sizes (indicating 
more altruism in the intuitive condition) than experiments using a give frame. The 
coefficient of the take frame dummy is indeed positive but not significantly differ-
ent from zero at the 5% level or lower (p = 0.074). The same holds in column (7) 
(p = 0.093). However, in column (8), where we do not control for study fixed effects 
and exploit both within- and between-study variation in the frame of the game, we 
find a statistically significant positive effect (p = 0.005). Based on these analyses, we 
8 One experiment (Chen and Krajbich 2018) used a subject pool comprised of individuals from Ger-
many and the US, and we cannot separate subjects based on nationality. This is why both the USA and 
EU dummies are coded as 1 for this experiment.
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tentatively suggest that the frame of the game might be a mediator of the effect of 
intuition on altruism, although more research on this specific factor seems warranted 
given the mixed results.
Type of intervention In column (6) we test whether there are systematic differ-
ences between the effect sizes reported in studies that use different types of manipu-
lation of cognitive resources. For instance, one may hypothesize that some types 
of manipulations (e.g. priming manipulations that prompt participants to consider 
the positive effects of “carefully reasoning through a problem”) may be more prone 
to demand effects than others, and thus promote a stronger effect. We thus include 
dummies for experiments relying on cognitive load (n = 15), ego depletion (n = 9), 
and priming (n = 9), with time pressure experiments (n = 27) as the base category.9 
We do not find any difference between types of manipulation, in any of the possible 
bilateral comparisons (all p > 0.690). The same holds for the regressions in columns 
(7) and (8).
Gender Rand et al. (2016) propose that gender is an important mediator of the 
role of intuition and deliberation on altruism. They argue that altruism may be an 
intuitive response for women more than for men. In their meta-study, they indeed 
find a significant difference between effect sizes for men and women. Moreover, in 
line with their hypothesis, they find that the estimated effect size is positive and sig-
nificant for women, while negative and insignificant for men (they use 5% as the 
probability of type-I error in their study, as we do in this paper).
For nearly all studies in our meta-analysis we can compute separate effect sizes 
for men and women and thus re-test the hypothesis put forward by Rand et al. (2016) 
with a much larger sample than they had available in their meta-study (50 experi-
ments involving 10,728 subjects compared to 22 experiments and 4366 subjects in 
Rand et al.). Table 2 reports random-effect meta-regressions based on the subsample 
of experiments for which we can compute gender-specific effect sizes.
Table 2  Mediator analysis: the role of gender
Random-effects meta-regressions. Dependent variable is the effect size associated to an experiment. The 
additional controls are the other mediators examined in Table 1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)








Study FE? Yes Yes No No
Additional controls? No Yes No Yes
N. effect sizes 100 100 100 100
N. experiments 50 50 50 50
N. subjects 10,728 10,728 10,728 10,728
9 In one case (Tinghög et al. 2016), the manipulation relies on a combination of cognitive load and ego 
depletion and hence we code both dummies as 1 for this experiment.
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In column (1) we only include a gender dummy as well as study dummies to con-
trol for study fixed effects, while in column (2) we also add the mediators listed in 
Table 1 as additional controls. In columns (3) and (4) we report analogous specifica-
tions but without study fixed effects. In all cases, we only detect a small difference 
between effect sizes for men and women, which is not statistically significant (p > 
0.193).
Figure 2 further illustrates this result. It contains forest plots showing the effect 
sizes and 95% confidence intervals of the 50 experiments used in the gender analy-
sis. The top panel of the figure shows the forest plot for men, while the bottom panel 
shows the plot for women. The last row of each panel reports the overall effect size 
estimated across all experiments.
In either case the gender-specific effects sizes are quite small. For men, the over-
all effect size is negative (− 0.079) and we can reject the null that the effect size is 
not zero at the 1% level (p = 0.002). For women, the overall effect size is also nega-
tive (− 0.008), but not different from zero at any conventional level of significance 
(p = 0.843). Thus, our results are in contrast with the findings reported by Rand et al. 
(2016), who found that promoting intuition increases altruistic behavior among 
women, but has no effect among men.10
Note that the sample we used to conduct the gender analysis differs in two ways 
from Rand et al.’s sample: we have added 32 experiments from 17 studies that were 
not available to Rand et al. at the time of their meta-analysis, and we have excluded 
4 experiments from 2 studies that Rand et al. had included, because they involved 
deception. Is the difference in results between our meta-analysis and Rand et al.’s 
due to the addition of new studies, or to the exclusion of the studies that involved 
deception? We repeated the analysis above using only the studies included in Rand 
et al. except those that involved deception. We can replicate Rand et al.’s results in 
this subsample: for men the overall effect size is negative (− 0.078), but insignificant 
at the 5% level or lower (p = 0.087), while for women the overall effect size is posi-
tive (0.135) and significant (p = 0.003). We then performed the analysis using only 
the new studies that were not available to Rand et al. In this case, the effect size is 
negative for both men (− 0.066) and women (− 0.070), and insignificantly different 
from zero at the 5% significance level or lower for either group (p = 0.063 for men; 
p = 0.139 for women). Thus, the difference in results is due to the addition of the 32 
experiments that were not included in Rand et al.11
Taken together, our results lend little support to the argument that there may be 
genuine heterogeneity in the size and direction of the effect of intuition on altruism 
across different subsamples, and that this may explain the mixed evidence reported 
in the literature about the overall effect of intuition on altruism. We think that the 
▸
10 However, given the mixed evidence on the role of gender for moderating the effect of intuition on 
altruism, it is entirely possible that our result and Rand et al.’s result are both false positives. We would 
therefore invite caution in drawing conclusions from this finding (also see Vosgerau et al. 2018 for a dis-
cussion of the perils of false positive results in internal and external meta-analyses).
11 Five of the new studies are based on donation games between a decision-maker and a charity. We 
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Fig. 2  Effect sizes for men (top panel) and women (bottom panel). Note: Effect sizes (ES) measured as 
standardized mean difference in altruism between conditions where intuition or deliberation were pro-
moted. Positive values imply more altruism in the intuitive condition. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. The size of the grey boxes indicates the weight of the effect size in the meta-analysis (the rela-
tive weights are also reported in the last column of the figure). The last row of the figure (labeled “Over-
all”) reports the average effect size across all experiments and its associated confidence interval. For a 
legend of the experiment IDs refer to Table A.1 in the OSM
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most likely explanation for the conflicting evidence reported in previous studies (and 
reproduced in our meta-analysis) is that this actually reflects contrasting false posi-
tive results. To further probe this conclusion, in the next section we report results 
from a novel experimental paradigm that, as we explain below, may allow to identify 
the effect of intuition on altruism even in the presence of heterogeneity in the direc-
tion of the effect triggered by the manipulation of cognitive resources.
3  New experiment
The starting point of our experimental design is the observation that, if choices 
that involve trade-offs between altruism and self-interest trigger a conflict between 
intuition and deliberation, then individuals exposed to such trade-offs will have to 
consume cognitive resources and willpower to regulate this conflict. Note that this 
is true regardless of whether one’s theory proposes that altruism is intuitive and 
self-interest deliberate, or whether it proposes instead that self-interest is intuitive 
and altruism deliberate. In the former case, willpower is required to rein in the pro-
social impulse; in the latter it serves to override the selfish impulse. In either case, 
the individual will have to use willpower when they face decisions that involve a 
trade-off between altruism and self-interest. In other words, these trade-offs are 
willpower-depleting.
This implies a straightforward prediction: individuals exposed to trade-offs 
between altruism and self-interest will have less willpower available for subsequent 
tasks that also require the use of willpower. A crucial advantage of this prediction 
is that it holds irrespective of whether altruism or self-interest are intuitive: it only 
requires that the intuitive process diverges from the deliberate process so that a con-
flict between the two systems arises. Therefore, the presence of heterogeneity in the 
direction of the effect does not constitute a problem. Even if intuition promotes self-
interest for a subgroup of subjects while it promotes altruism for another subgroup, 
both subgroups will experience a conflict when exposed to trade-offs between altru-
ism and self-interest, and this will affect the cognitive resources that both types of 
subjects have access to in subsequent tasks.
3.1  Experimental design
We test this prediction in a new experiment where we reverse the order of tasks 
typically used in ego depletion experiments: we use a series of 16 dictator games 
as the first, willpower-depleting task; and a second cognitively-demanding and 
willpower-requiring task (a version of the Stroop 1935 color-word task)" to be 
consistent with the way citations appear when parentheses are used elsewhere in 
the paper, to measure the effect of participating in the dictator games on residual 
willpower.
In the first task, subjects were randomly matched in pairs to participate in the 
16 dictator games shown in Table 3. In each pair, one subject was allocated the 
role of dictator and the other the role of recipient. Pairs and roles were kept fixed 
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across the 16 games. Across two between-subject treatments, we manipulated 
the extent to which the dictator games required exertion of willpower by varying 
the structure of payoffs of the games. In the 16 games of our Conflict treatment, 
the option that maximized the dictator’s payoff always minimized the recipient’s 
payoff. Thus, in this treatment dictators faced a series of trade-offs between self-
interested and altruistic choices, as is customary in standard dictator games. In 
our NoConflict treatment, we removed this trade-off by manipulating payoffs so 
that the option that maximized the dictator’s payoff also maximized the recipi-
ent’s payoff.
Table 3  Payoffs in the binary dictator games
In each game, dictators could choose between two options, A or B, each implying a different distribution 
of money between themselves and the recipient. For each option, the first number indicates the dictator’s 
payoff and the second number the recipient’s payoff (both displayed in GBP). In both treatments, the 16 
games were presented to subjects in the same order as shown in the table
Conflict NoConflict
Game Option A Option B Option A Option B
1 8; 8 12; 0 8; 0 12; 8
2 11; 1 8; 8 11; 8 8; 1
3 9; 1 7; 5 9; 5 7; 1
4 7; 5 8; 2 7; 2 8; 5
5 10; 6 12; 0 10; 0 12; 6
6 8; 8 16; 0 8; 0 16; 8
7 6; 6 8; 4 6; 4 8; 6
8 10; 2 9; 7 10; 7 9; 2
9 12; 0 6; 6 12; 6 6; 0
10 11; 5 15; 1 11; 1 15; 5
11 8; 4 10; 2 8; 2 10; 4
12 9; 3 8; 4 9; 4 8; 3
13 10; 6 8; 8 10; 8 8; 6
14 13; 3 10; 6 13; 3 10; 3
15 6; 6 8; 2 6; 2 8; 6
16 10; 0 6; 4 10; 4 6; 0
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In both treatments, subjects then participated in a version of the Stroop (1935) 
color-word task, which is often used to measure willpower depletion.12 Subjects 
were shown, for five minutes, a series of words of color names printed in various 
font colors. Both color names and font colors were either black, blue, green, red, or 
yellow. The font colors and color names were randomly matched so that, for each 
word, the font color did not correspond to the color name. Subjects had to indicate, 
for each word, which color it was printed in, and not the color that the word read.13 
This task requires regulation of choice because, in order to submit a correct answer, 
subjects must override their intuitive and automatic impulse to respond by read-
ing the color name of the word, and look at its font color instead. Thus, the task 
demands continuous exertion of willpower by the participant to regulate the conflict 
that arises between their intuitive and deliberative systems.
If willpower is a resource that can be depleted with use (Muraven and Baumeister 
2000; Baumeister et al. 2007), and if the 16 games of the Conflict treatment require 
more use of willpower than the corresponding games of NoConflict, then we would 
expect dictators in Conflict to arrive at the Stroop task with less residual willpower 
than those in NoConflict, and therefore to be comparatively less able to expend fur-
ther willpower during the Stroop task. In Sect. 3.3, we test this hypothesis by com-
paring the number of correct answers given by dictators in the Stroop task between 
our two treatments.
Note that the crucial assumption underlying our test is that the trade-offs faced by 
dictators in the 16 games of the Conflict treatment trigger a series of motivational 
conflicts that are depleting in terms of willpower, whereas such conflicts (and hence 
willpower depletion) do not arise in the NoConflict treatment. The rationale for this 
assumption is based on recent findings from the depletion literature that making 
choices, particularly choices that involve large trade-offs between options, is costly 
in terms of willpower. Vohs et  al. (2008), for instance, show that even mundane, 
small-cost choices (e.g., choosing between different colored t-shirts) cause will-
power depletion as measured in a series of tasks that require exertion of self-control 
(e.g., making oneself drink an unsavory beverage; or submerging one’s arm in cold 
water). Spears (2011) reports analogous findings using a Stroop-like task to measure 
willpower depletion. Moreover, Wang et al. (2010) show that choices involving large 
trade-offs are more depleting than choices involving small trade-offs. These findings 
suggest that, to the extent that dual-system theories extend to altruistic behavior, the 
12 See MacLeod (1991) for a review of studies using the Stroop task. In dual-task studies, the Stroop 
task has been used both as a task to measure willpower depletion and as a willpower-depleting task. 
Hagger et al. (2010) show that the task is particularly sensitive to willpower depletion relative to other 
commonly used tasks (e.g. math or mental arithmetic or solvable anagrams) and thus is well suited 
as a dependent measure. There is some evidence that the task is instead less effective when used as a 
willpower-depleting instrument (Hagger et al. 2010; Carter et al. 2015). In the economics literature, the 
Stroop task has been predominantly used as a willpower-depleting task to study, for example, the effects 
of willpower depletion on procrastination (Burger et al. 2011), sensitivity to framing effects (De Haan 
and Van Veldhuizen 2015) and time preferences (Kuhn et al. 2014).
13 For instance, if the word “green” was printed in blue, the correct answer was “blue” and not “green”. 
If a correct answer was given, a new word appeared on the screen; if the answer was incorrect the same 
word remained on the screen. Subjects were rewarded with £0.10 for each correct answer.
995
1 3
Altruism, fast and slow? Evidence from a meta-analysis and…
trade-offs implied in the 16 games of the Conflict treatment should in principle also 
be willpower-depleting.
Of course, an ancillary assumption for our test is that the induced depletion of 
willpower is large enough to produce a detectable effect given the statistical power of 
the experiment.14 Thus, our design includes a series of elements aimed at strength-
ening the effect and hence maximizing the chances of detection. First, based on the 
evidence that the extent to which willpower is depleted is positively related to the 
duration of the depleting task (Vohs et al. 2008; Hagger et al. 2010), we had dictators 
face 16 decision problems, each time with different payoffs, so that they were forced 
to reconsider their choice each time a new game was presented to them.15 Moreover, 
we chose to decrease dictator-recipient anonymity and to have recipients interact with 
dictators throughout part one in order to reduce social distance between dictators and 
recipients and create a starker conflict between altruism and self-interest.16
In order to test whether we were successful in creating a perceivable conflict 
between altruistic and self-interested motives in the Conflict treatment, we included 
in the post-experimental questionnaire, as a manipulation check, two questions ask-
ing dictators to rate the extent to which they found the dictator game choices “hard” 
and “uncomfortable”.17 Dictators in the Conflict treatment reported that choices 
in the dictator games were harder and more uncomfortable relative to dictators in 
NoConflict (hard: mean 3.07, s.d. 2.64 vs. mean 0.84, s.d. 1.75; discomfort: mean 
4.12, s.d. 3.26 vs. mean 1.05, s.d. 1.90). For both questions, we find that responses 
are significantly different across the two treatments (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney 
tests; hard: p < 0.001; discomfort: p < 0.001).18 This suggests that dictators in 
the Conflict treatment may have indeed perceived a stronger motivational conflict 
than dictators in NoConflict. In Sect. 3.3, we test whether the (perceived) stronger 
14 As we discuss later, given our sample size, we are powered to detect effects of size 0.40 or larger in 
terms of Cohen’s d. The effects reported in the depleting literature are quite large. Vohs et al. (2008), for 
instance, report an average effect of d = 0.93 across their 5 lab experiments on the willpower-depleting 
effects of choosing among small household products.
15 Payoffs were manipulated to vary: (1) the dictator’s endowment (either GBP 10, 12 or 16); (2) the 
opportunity cost of making the choice that most benefited the recipient; (3) whether an equal split of 
money was available in the choice set; and (4) whether making the own payoff-maximizing choice 
reduced joint payoffs.
16 Decreasing anonymity has been shown to significantly increase giving in previous dictator-game 
experiments (e.g., Bohnet and Frey 1999; Charness and Gneezy 2008). Dictator giving has also been 
shown to increase when recipients interact with dictators (e.g., Yamamori et  al. 2007, 2008). In our 
experiment, we reduced anonymity by making subjects type their first name on their computer at the 
beginning of part one. This was then shown to the person they were paired with in part one. Moreover, 
we forced dictators to wait after each decision until the recipient they were paired with had been shown 
the dictator’s decision and had confirmed that they had seen it (and the dictator was notified about this).
17 These items were: “Overall, how hard was it to choose between option A and option B in the 16 situ-
ations of Part 1?”, and “Overall, to what extent did you experience discomfort in making your choices 
in the 16 situations of Part 1?”. Responses were collected on a scale from 0 (“not at all”) to 10 (“very 
much”).
18 All tests reported in this section use the individual as the independent unit of observation and there-
fore are based on 99 dictators per treatment.
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conflict resulted in a more severe depletion of willpower as measured by dictators’ 
Stroop task performance across the two treatments.
3.2  Experimental procedures
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and was conducted 
at the University of Nottingham using students from a wide range of disciplines 
recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2015). We have 
396 subjects in total across 13 sessions, equally divided between the two treatments. 
Thus, our analysis is based on 99 dictators per treatment. This implies that we can 
detect effects of size 0.40 or larger (Cohen’s d) with 80% power and 5% probability 
of a type-I error, using a two-sided Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test.
We report a detailed description of the procedures used in the experiment in 
Appendix B in the OSM and reproduce the experimental instructions in Appendix 
C. We paid subjects using a random incentive lottery system. At the end of each 
session, one of the two parts of the experiment was selected at random and sub-
jects were paid according to their earnings from the selected part. If part one was 
selected, one of the 16 games was chosen at random and subjects were paid accord-
ing to their earnings in that game. Sessions lasted approximately 50 min and earn-
ings ranged between GBP0 and GBP19, averaging GBP11.81 (s.d. 4.77).
3.3  Dictators’ performance in the Stroop task
Figure 3 shows the average number of correct answers in the Stroop task by dictators 
in the Conflict and NoConflict treatments. Dictators in Conflict gave fewer correct 





































Fig. 3  Performance in the Stroop task, by treatment. Note: Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals com-
puted as  ± 1.96 ∗ SE where  is the estimated mean, SE is its standard error, and 1.96 is the z-score 
for the 97.5 percentile point of the normal distribution
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mean 149.44, s.d. 15.82). The resulting effect size (measured as Cohen’s d) is 
− 0.192. The difference in performance is not statistically significant according to a 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.157). An OLS regression (reported in Appen-
dix D in the OSM) confirms that the difference in performance remains insignificant 
after controlling for a number of observable characteristics of the subjects (includ-
ing gender) and of the decision setting.19
4  Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, our aim was to probe the validity of a dual-system approach to altruis-
tic behavior, by testing the hypothesis that trade-offs between self-interest and altru-
ism trigger a conflict between our “fast”, intuitive System 1 and our “slower”, more 
deliberative System 2. We performed a meta-analysis of the existing literature on 
the relation between altruism and intuition/deliberation and found that the manipula-
tions used in previous experiments to promote the intuitive system at the expense of 
the deliberative system (using ego depletion tasks, cognitive load, time pressure or 
priming) have an overall effect on altruism that is very close to, and not significantly 
different from, zero.
Can this aggregate null result be due to the fact that the relation between altruism 
and our two systems is genuinely heterogeneous across different subgroups and deci-
sion situations, as some researchers have suggested? We find little evidence that this 
may be the case. We first run a mediator analysis based on the existing literature and 
consider a number of potential mediators of the relation between intuition and altru-
ism (including mediators previously suggested in the literature, such as gender, the 
stakes of the experiment, or the frame of the task). We find that none of the mediators 
included in the analysis play a significant role in explaining the mixed results in exist-
ing studies. One possible exception is the frame of the task, for which we find evi-
dence of a mediating effect in some specifications of the analysis, but not in others.
We then designed and ran a new experiment that allowed us to probe the valid-
ity of dual-system theories of altruism without being vulnerable to the presence 
of unobserved and/or unanticipated heterogeneity in the relation between altruism 
and intuition. We argue that, if trade-offs between altruism and self-interest trigger 
19 Another possible source of heterogeneity, that may weaken the aggregate effect, is the strength of the 
conflict between self-interest and altruistic concerns that subjects may have experienced during the dic-
tator games. Subjects who have no concern for others and are exclusively motivated by self-interest (or 
vice versa subjects who have no concern for their self-interest and are exclusively motivated by altruism) 
may have experienced little or no motivational conflict and depletion of willpower during the dictator 
games. It is difficult, however, to identify this subgroup of dictators in our sample, since the choices in 
the dictator games are not indicative of whether or not the decision-maker has experienced a motiva-
tional conflict in making those choices. For example, observing an own payoff-maximizing choice in a 
game does not reveal whether this has been made by an entirely self-interested dictator, who experienced 
no conflict in making such choice, or by an other-regarding dictator who was conflicted in her deci-
sion but ultimately opted for the selfish option. In Appendix D we report an analysis based on the self-
reported perception of conflict experienced in the dictator games, and find no evidence that this moder-
ates the treatment effect in our experiment.
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a conflict between the intuitive and deliberative systems, then being exposed to 
these trade-offs should be willpower-depleting. We do not find evidence that this is 
the case. Directionally, the effect is in line with the hypothesis: subjects who were 
exposed to trade-offs between altruism and self-interest perform worse on a task that 
requires willpower than subjects who were not exposed to such trade-offs. However, 
we cannot reject the null that the two groups perform similarly.20
Overall, the combination of evidence from the meta-study and the new experiment 
suggests that choices that involve trade-offs between altruism and self-interest do not 
trigger any strong conflict between intuition and deliberation. This could be because, 
in the realm of altruistic behavior, the decision processes governed by the intuitive 
and deliberative systems may actually both lead to the same outcome for any given 
individual. That is, the two systems are not actually in conflict when it comes to mak-
ing these type of decisions, and hence their outcome is the same. Alternatively, the 
null results reported in the literature and in our new experiment could mean that the 
lens of dual-system models does not extend to altruistic behavior. In either case, our 
study offers little support for the notion that, in the domain of altruistic choices, the 
individual must spend cognitive resources to override the intuitive impulse when the 
person wants to take a choice favored by the deliberative system.
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